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 abstract 
This paper addresses alternative models for a reflexive methodology and examines the ways in 
which doctoral students have appropriated these texts in their theses.  It then considers the 
indeterminate qualities of those appropriations. The paper offers a new account of reflexivity as 
‘picturing’, drawing analogies from the interpretation of two very different pictures, by 
Velázquez and Tshibumba. It concludes with a more open and fluid account of reflexivity, 
offering the notion of ‘signature’, and drawing on the work of Gell and also Deleuze and 
Guattari in relation to the inherently specific nature of ‘concepts’ situated in space and time. 
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 ‘The apparatus of reason would not be complete unless it swept itself into its own 
analysis of the field of experience’ (G.H. Mead 1934/1962: 138). 
 
‘There are two styles of philosophers: eg and ie philosophers – illustrators and 
explicators. Illustrators trust, first and foremost, striking examples, in contrast with 
explicators, who trust, first and foremost, definitions and general principles’ (Margalit 
2002: ix). 
 
 
introduction  
The histories of reflexivity are many and various. There is a ghostly ‘positivist’ account that 
seeks origins in scientific warrants, analogically derived (eg Heisenberg). If the scientific 
observer has to be regarded as part of the experiment, then all the more complicit will be the 
observer bent on social inquiry. Then there is the reflexivity which would seek to locate itself 
within a community of researchers, including scientists. In this account, promoted by the SSK 
group (eg Woolgar 1988, Ashmore 1989, Latour 1988), the socially constructed nature of all 
knowledge, including scientific knowledge, requires that we introduce a reflexive dimension to 
accounts of its ‘discovery’, and indeed that we regard metaphors of ‘discovery’ as themselves 
the epistemological deceptions of a correspondence theory. Again, we might turn to Macbeth’s 
analytic notion of ‘positional reflexivity’ (Macbeth 2001: 37) wherein attempts are made – often 
confessionally – to align ‘methodological rigor with a critically disciplined subjectivity’ (ibid: 39). 
Macbeth also considers a contrasting ‘textual reflexivity’ that reflects the well-known ‘linguistic 
turn’ in anthropology (eg Marcus & Cushman 1982, Clifford & Marcus 1986, Rosaldo 1987). A 
fourth alternative is offered by Macbeth in relation to an ethnomethodological return to 
‘essential indexicality’ (Macbeth 2001: 49), whereby reflexivity is identified as the everyday 
resource of individuals in society.  Foley, indeed, offers a typology of various reflexive 
approaches even though such an analytical strategy is itself a way of taking sides, 
epistemologically speaking (Foley 2002). Denzin opts for a more decidedly performative 
reflexivity (Denzin 2003). All of these approaches differ, but as both Macbeth and Foley 
concede, are not always distinct. Our approach in this article will be eclectic, combining aspects 
of textualist and performative approaches, and avoiding static labelling. We envisage reflexivity 
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as dynamic, a Deleuzian ‘concept’, or signature as we eventually argue it. More practically, we 
will be looking at the ‘ambivalent practices of reflexivity’ (Davies et al. 2004: 360-389). Unlike 
Davies et al, however, we will draw not on ourselves as evidence of reflexive practice but on 
the reflexive practices of doctoral candidates whose theses reflect the ways in which they 
chose to appropriate reflexive methodological texts. To our knowledge, reflexivity has not been 
studied ‘empirically’ in this way. Finally, we will return to the problem of reflexive ‘modality’: if 
there cannot be a model, or models for reflexivity, then what can be said about the enterprise in 
terms of ‘sensitizing’ rather than ‘prescribing’ (Guillemin & Gillam 2004: 278)? Can reflexivity be 
made to perform in heuristic ways, even if it cannot be de- or pre-scribed? In the fluid 
metaphors of Deleuze, ‘[t]he only question is how anything works, with its intensities, flows, 
processes, partial objects..’ (Deleuze 1995: 22). 
 
constructing reflexive selves 
We begin by offering a brief sketch of three different ‘models’ of reflexivity, offered to 
educational researchers at MMU as methodological warrants and methodical guides. These 
are somewhat encapsulated and no doubt parodic, but we are interested here in how these 
reflexive positions were appropriated by doctoral ‘users’ rather than in the detail of the original 
arguments1.  The progenitor of the reflexive series for present purposes was Peshkin, who in 
1988 offered an account of the reflexive researcher as comprising, in his case, six segments. 
These ‘multiple I’s offered access to founding prejudices or dispositions that could be 
addressed by the researcher in ongoing self-scrutiny. An obvious criticism was that they also 
depended on an unexplicated transcendental position that allowed him to look down on these 
selves from nowhere, as it were. Arguably this was a rather masculinist and mechanistic 
management of reflexivity, based on a realist option. In doctoral workshop, it was dubbed the 
Clockwork Orange.  Heshusius (1994:18) later criticised this model.  Instead of segments, she 
proposed a fusion of I and Thou, the ‘selfother’ (sic) of a ‘participatory consciousness’. To 
workshop participants this often seemed a better mnemonic than it was a heuristic. Clearly it 
                                                      
1 The first of the MMU doctoral training sessions, ‘Reflexivity Workshop’, June 1996, featured the following 
readings, some of which were articles, some single chapters or excerpts:  McRobbie (1993), Meyerhoff and Ruby 
(1992), Peshkin (1988), Heshusius (1994), Frankel (1991) Ashmore (1989), Cassell (1991), Lenzo (1994), 
Escobar (1993), Calvino (1965/1993), Lather (1993), Plummer (extract of unpublished PhD, 1996), Allan (extract 
of unpublished PhD 1995), Ball (1993). Participants were asked to select and read beforehand one or two texts; 
small group sessions shared knowledge of, and insight into, the texts; plenary sessions developed overall themes 
and possible ‘positions’. The sample of users comprised completed doctoral dissertations from those attending 
such seminars since 1996. The account here represents the divergence of responses rather than any typicality. It 
does so because we are interested in how the chosen methodological texts were deployed, in a range of 
appropriations. 
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was more of a phenomenological option, and one we nicknamed the Ontological Omelette.  
The final commentator was Lenzo (1994). She offered neither a segmentary self nor a self-
other fusion. Instead, she invoked a kind of anti-model, talking the language of transgression 
and incompletion by citing Lather. This was certainly a poststructuralist option with some 
version of a ‘fractured-I’ (Deleuze 1994: 145) - we called it Humpty Dumpty. Arguably there are 
many other ‘reflexive’ papers we could have referred to, but we are concerned with those which 
most strongly resonated with, and were appropriated by, our PhD students.  How were these 
various methodological texts taken up?  If we are to be reflexive about reflexivity, and there 
seems no choice, then we need to ask ‘what does reflexivity do, as well as mean?’ (an 
illocutionary cocern in Austin’s terms, 1962/1989), and ‘what would be a reflexive approach to 
such enactments?’ (a prescriptive rather than descriptive ambition). A neglected way of getting 
into these issues is empirical (compare Young 2001) – to look at the ways in which doctoral 
students, exposed to texts such as Peshkin, Heshusius and Lenzo, have responded.  
 
The first surprise is the great range of legitimating strategies engendered by these founding 
texts, given that each aims to prescribe and proscribe ‘approaches’ to reflexive educational 
inquiry. Starting from Peshkin’s ‘multiple-I’, which posited a segmented self, managing its 
various manifestations within the research process; several launched a retrospective and 
ongoing search for the self engaged in the creation of data and text. In some cases, the  
researcher was seen as an ‘emerging’ self (Plummer, 1996: 1), the youngest of the ‘voices’  
(ibid: 3). Accordingly, she also learned from overlapping selves, such as the ‘counsellor’ and 
the ‘teacher’, or the ‘mother’ and ‘principal’ in Ĕrculj’s case (2003). It was a self, therefore, ‘still 
being created and re-created’ in the research process (ibid.  2003: 97). There was also a dutiful 
scrutiny of segmented selves whose ‘thwarting biases’ (Plummer 1996: 9) were subject to 
retrospective analysis, such as Koren’s (2002) self-diagnosis of a ‘professional-I’ making 
assumptions about interpretation ahead of the data. The latter expressed the disabling ghosts  
of familiarity in relation to the subject of the inquiry, while the former amounted to the sorts of 
‘enabling’ selves that Peshkin largely had in mind.  Others interpreted Peshkin rather differently 
by identifying the conscious generation of a series of research selves within the acts of 
research itself, rather than as accompanying selves to that process. For Allan (1995: 52) ‘the 
marginal/subversive’ role was an ongoing Garfinkel-like subterfuge, a style of research 
                                                      
2 Peshkin reported the experience of ‘stumbling’ upon his subjectivity – then deciding this was something he 
wanted to avoid. 
 4
engagement necessary for the generation of a Foucauldian perspective on inclusion while 
simultaneously conducting government-funded empirical evaluation. The perspective dictated a 
certain ethical duplicity, or so she intended. This self was generative, strategically both open 
and closed to its interlocutors, and eventually in the thesis a self-confessed ‘undercover agent’.  
 
So segmented selves were all subject to some kind of inventory, constructed by authors 
looking over their shoulders via research diaries, data, and theoretical excursions.  Such 
‘selving’ could provoke more ontological sorts of tension in the authors’ inquiries. Selves 
offered a simultaneously dangerous and productive contamination of each other, as in Trunk 
Širca’s case. Director of a tertiary college, and researching her own institution, her balancing of 
a managing self and a research self was always a precarious ‘question of power exercised for 
and against itself’ (2002: 72). Her selves inhabited a cuckoo’s nest of Truth and Power. She 
was part of the ‘power’ that the ‘truth’ of her inquiry tried to interrogate. In such inherently 
conflicted accounts there was always an obvious risk: that Truth into Power Won’t Go. 
 
Still others shifted the debate more firmly away from roles and selves to standpoints, translating 
Peshkin’s pluralities into such things as a ‘multiple centred standpoint epistemology’ (Jones 
1997: 131) while claiming a ‘mutually dependent’ relationship between teacher and researcher 
selves.  In this account Peshkin is chewed over, but not swallowed: ‘It is interesting that 
Peshkin did not acknowledge a seventh self, the “academic – I” that constructed the entire 
account’ (Jones 1997: 100). Others sought to undermine the notion of selves in an attempt to 
tell a ‘journey’ of a self that aimed for a ‘wily versatility that will allow me to think and speak both 
“as if” the lesbian self does exist and “as if” it does not’ (Riding 2002: 47, 79). Riding inserted 
selves not as retrospective ‘discoveries’, but as tactics to produce a divided political 
epistemology where perspectives might productively conflict – a crossroads where 
Poststructuralism encountered Standpoint Epistemology or Critical Realism (Lewis 2000; 
Roberts, 2004).  
 
Thus selves could be engendered in the real as ‘discovered’ past roles at work in the inquiry or 
transformed into personated epistemologies, as a dialogue of ideas generative of a ‘research 
self’ – such as the ‘black researcher’, the ‘lesbian researcher’. Ĕrculj (2003) added another 
mobility by casting doubt on the permanence of any of these divisions, opting for a more 
occasional, emergent and situated sense of research consciousnesses, drawing particular 
attention to a ‘theory-laden – I’ whose emergence re-contoured the configurations of 
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management and organisational issues in contra-distinction to a ‘tradition-laden-I’ steeped in a 
Slovenian professional and national culture. This was an ongoing reframing of the research self 
as an emerging but unrealizable synthesis, an ‘unsettled hybrid’ as another doctoral author put 
it (Hanley 2001: 170). For several, there was a partly unresolved problem in telling, as it were, 
realist stories about their poststructuralist selves. Finally, Jones offered an iconoclastic attack 
on all such selves and selving. Starting from Lenzo’s Lather-based notion of a ‘transgressive 
self’ (1997: 130) he attacked the telling of methodological stories (in the style of Ashmore, 
1989) and  reported such narratives as plotlines, mocking the solemnity of methodological 
narrative within a Mickey Spillane genre in which academic credentials were interrogated and 
despatched:  
 
‘His high-pitched pleading annoyed me but I let him whine, “There are many teachers” 
voices, not just one” (1997: 13). I stubbed my cigarette out on the collar and helped 
him towards the broken window. What the hell was that supposed to mean? […] “There 
are other voices worth articulating, hearing, and sponsoring as well as those of 
teachers”. I let him drop’ (Jones 1997: 208). 
 
This perspectival, ironic approach culminated in supervisors, subjects, and author being 
required to enact in his thesis a triple ‘play’ of reflexive meaning (play as drama, as fun, as 
looseness), a play with a possible sting in the tale for articles such as this. There is ‘… little 
point in outlining a handbook of reflexivity because as soon as it was created its processes 
would need to be subverted by the truly reflexive researcher’ (ibid: 1997: 87). Selves, in his 
account, are eventually realized as fiction – within a play that addresses issues of 
performativity rather than claiming to represent any ‘real’ situation in itself, or ‘real’ selves, 
whether segmented or participatory in nature.  
 
There are many other ways in which these doctoral authors drew on their ‘founding’ 
methodologies in order to construct research selves. In the first section of this paper, we have 
attended most closely to the tightest of the three prescriptions, the managed research selves of 
Peshkin. Yet that text was appropriated in a great variety of ways. Its indeterminations are 
more impressive than its determinations. It was ‘provocative’ when it intended to be ‘realist’, 
‘transgressive’ when it sought fidelity. And the translations seemed most interesting and 
creative the more unfaithful they were to the original text. They introduced a range of realist, 
hermeneutic, poststructuralist and postmodernist deployments. But perhaps we have said 
enough about their diverse strategies to encourage us to think in more interesting ways about 
what is going on when one reading enters another, and then re-emerges with a claim to 
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methodological warrant.  We came to call such ‘translations’ and ‘appropriations’ revisionary, in 
order to point to the creative infidelities and apparent inversions involved. What questions can 
we cull from this brief review of the way three ER texts were so differently read and re-written in 
their journey – ‘trip’ might be better2 - from academic reading to enacted methodological text? 
What can we say of this ‘doctoring’ of the text? Of the picturing of selves that went on in each 
author’s encounter with the Methodologists of Reflexivity?  
 
picturing selves 
Each ‘reflexive’ author sought to figure herself from the ground of research practice, as well as 
the ‘air’ of reflexive theory. That double extraction involves of course, crucial metaphorical 
decisions. The perceptual play of figure/ground? The punning ‘mine’ of extraction? The ways in 
which we relate such articulations of self ‘systematically’ to the practices of inquiry are crucial. 
In the light of our preliminary empirical study of such (dis)articulations we propose here the 
notion of ‘grounded metaphor’. We seek to explore precisely those indeterminations in 
methodological texts that appear to undermine their grounds for legitimacy and the possibility of 
systematicity. Such indeterminations seem both important and neglected. Methodology seeks 
to contain indeterminacies, whereas we prefer to explore and mobilise them as far as possible. 
 
In deciding which metaphors to deploy in order to develop a sense of - for is better - reflexivity, 
we intend accordingly to avoid those metaphors that carry a realist or positivist implication, 
such as the ‘mirror’3. As we have shown, the reflexive picturing of our authors was much more 
performative than that, and suggested a more loosely coupled articulation of one text upon the 
other, a kind of fruitful miscegenation. Their methodologies were not ‘applied’ instances of the 
                                                      
3 The ‘mirror’ has a long and distinguished history as a metaphor of self-regard, from Narcissus through to the 
work of Gasché (1986) on the ‘tain’ of the mirror. We do not wish to imply that such a metaphor takes us nowhere, 
but we suspect that it will not take us anywhere new, and therefore seek to cast around the reflexive stories in 
order to provoke new possibilities. ‘The “matrix” produces the matrix and nothing else’ (Letiche and Maier 2001: 5) 
- or perhaps the mirror all too easily becomes metonymic rather than metaphoric. 
4 ‘Acts’ are a misnomer in so far as they imply conscious and intentional implementation. We would rather regard 
reflexivity as an event in which we somewhat intentionally participate, but nevertheless acknowledge inescapable 
remainders of the unconscious and the unintended.  
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general so much as singular variations on an underlying theme. A necessary improvisation? 
Further, their idiosyncrasy underpinned claims to originality. Where doctoral candidates stuck 
most closely to the prescriptions of the methodology, creativity was least. The least conceivable 
metaphors for this sort of process were ‘application’ and ‘representation’. In Peshkin’s terms, it 
was the ‘untamed’ self that seemed to be the necessary precondition for good thinking, and we 
need to consider what it was about that indiscipline that made thinking the ‘self’ creative.  
 
Such serial infidelity reminded us of the ways in which art-works (themselves inquiries into 
meaning’s meaning) sometimes give birth to a series of re-interpretations, as in the visual 
commentaries on Velázquez’s Las Meñinas by Picasso, Manet, Dégas and so on.  These were 
not of course replications so much as they were responses, which raised interesting questions 
about what qualities in the ‘original’ called forth subsequent evocations, and in what ways these 
‘exceeded’ the former. Were these ‘representations’, ‘dialogues’, ‘transformations’, 
‘developments’?  What tropes did we need to deploy here, and with what justification? And 
what meanings could be given to such processes? In addition there was formidable academic 
and literary commentary on the meaning of such ‘picturing’ that might provoke new thinking on  
reflexive matters in educational research. Such commentary offered us a double entry into 
visual and textual registers concerning acts4 of reflexive performance. A review of 
indetermination in relation both to accounts of theory and narrative suggested some 
provocative possibilities. For example, we asked what was the composition of such ‘picturing’? 
There were elements of narrative, logic, figure, ‘scene’ (Rosaldo 1978), emotional tone, and 
philosophy. In all these aspects there are good reasons for expecting imprecision. Just to 
illustrate, Primo Levi, discusses the ‘secrets of the trade, indeed, the non-trade’ of the narrative 
writing that expresses and contains all these aspects: 
 
‘They exist, I cannot deny it, but luckily they have no general validity; I say “luckily” 
because, if they did, all writers would write in the same way, thus generating such an 
enormous mass of boredom’ (Levi 1991: 207). 
 
Research accounts, then, in so far as they are narratives, demand ‘novel selves’. Such a view 
would inform the sorts of research selves envisaged by Denzin in terms of a ‘reflexive poetic’ 
(Denzin 1997: 223).  Kamuf takes the argument further, arguing that the impossibility of a self                                     
present to itself (foreground and background always being hidden from each other) is in itself 
productive, ‘… it is these very limits, demarcating intention, that produce it, and allow it to 
function as such’ (Kamuf 1991: 81). Elsewhere: ‘The difference is inscribed at the limit; it is the 
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difference, or différance of that limit – its division – that holds I-we apart together and thus 
opens each to the other’ (1997: 122). Accordingly Kamuf denies the possibility of reproduction, 
fidelity and stability, arguing instead for ‘the graphic of iterability rather than the logic of 
repetition’ (1991: 86). It is, then, reflexivity’s impossibility that makes it work, as ‘impossibility’ is 
part of the creative process. This is a familiar Derridean kind of thinking, but Polanyi earlier 
made a similar point in relation to ‘tacit knowing’, concerning the impossibility of formalizing 
such knowledge: 
    
‘If such formalization of tacit knowing were possible, it would convert all arts into 
mathematically prescribed operations, and thus destroy them as works of art’ (Polanyi 
1962, in Grene 1969: 164).  
 
That seems to recall Calvino’s suspicion of ‘trade secrets’. Finally, we might acknowledge 
Heidegger: 
 
‘The more genuinely a methodological concept is worked out and the more 
comprehensively it determines the principles on which a science is conducted, all the 
more primordially is it rooted in the way we come to terms with the things themselves, 
and the farther is it removed from what we call ‘technical devices’, though there are 
many such devices in the theoretical disciplines’ (1962: 50). 
 
We do not wish to present these arguments against technical reduction and rule-bound 
specification as refutations of Peshkin or Heshusius, or recommendations for Lenzo, so much 
as reasons why methodological writers have had their texts appropriated in ways they did not 
prescribe and presumably would not approve. Nor do we wish to instigate a different paradigm 
with new slogans: ‘iterability not repetition!’ ‘indetermination (mis)rules!’ etc. Instead, we want to 
experiment with the concept of reflexivity in a different way, suspending any notion of further 
definition and looking instead for ‘striking examples’ of performative reflexivity, forged in the 
sort of philosophizing that Deleuze and Guattari recommend, one dedicated to ‘fabricating 
concepts’ (1994: 2). Such a hybrid fabrication offers a dynamic that links the visual, textual and 
performative in a hybridity whose becoming is its only possibility of coherence. 
 
In this thought experiment we intend to explore ‘picturing’ as a grounded metaphor which 
addresses (though never exhaustively) the business of reflexivity. First we need to remember 
that we mean this metaphor to be for reflexivity (as a project) rather than a metaphor of 
reflexivity (as a definition). This is important in that the metaphor should exhaust itself in 
relation to its end, and not its means. Second, it is clear from the reflexive accounts we have 
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examined that methodological application, procedural specification and so on, rather mistake 
the appropriations that doctoral authors made from the founding texts. Instead, we wanted to 
explore empirically how authors ‘pictured themselves’ in their accounts, bringing in theory, 
method, biography, introspection, retrospection, witness and so on. But at the same time we 
don’t want to create a kind of negative theology, or a kind of anything-goes relativism. We need 
to be able to say, somehow, what will count as good ‘picturing’ rather than inadequate 
‘picturing’5, while at the same time refusing a contextual specification or universal criterial 
judgement. We say more about this later, but meanwhile invoke Margalit’s distinction between 
‘eg’ and ‘ie’ approaches to philosophical inquiry. The former is founded on illustration, the latter  
on explication6. Our claim is that our doctoral colleagues invoked the latter and performed the 
former in relation to their methodological ‘extractions’. Such a distinction overlaps with ‘inside-
out’ and ‘outside-in’ ethical claims (Dawson 1994)7. We later explore that overlap as a potential 
political space – relating indetermination (etc) to notions of trust and freedom (etc). First, 
however, it is to a more detailed study of how such illustration, such picturing, works, that we 
now turn. 
 
figuring pictures 
Our strategy in this section is to proceed by example rather than rule (see Margalit at the 
beginning of the paper). Our examples are two very different artists. One is a Zairean street 
artist, Tshibumba, whose pictorial history of Zaire has been studied by the anthropologist 
Fabian (1996). The second is Velázquez and in particular, the ways in which his painting Las 
Meñinas has been analyzed by Foucault, Searle and Snyder, as well as reiterated by later 
                                                      
5 Maybe taking comfort from Bourdieu (1992: 244) who claimed ‘methodology is like spelling … “it is the science of 
the jack-asses”. It consists of a compendium of errors of which one can say that you must be dumb to commit 
most of them’. 
6 Tarde put this slightly differently ‘So far all the philosophy has been founded on the verb to be … one may say 
that, if only philosophy had been founded on the verb to have, many … slowdown of the mind, would have been 
avoided’ (Tarde quoted in Latour 2001: 17). Tambiah makes a similar point in distinguishing between ‘denotation’ 
and ‘exemplification’ (Tambiah 1990: 104). 
 
7 Dawson argues for a distinction between Aristotelian ‘inside-out’ professionalism as opposed to the externally 
regulated version – ‘outside-in’ professionalism, as encouraged, for example, by the audit culture. An exemplary 
rather than a definitive ethics is proposed. See also Stronach et al 2002. 
8 This appeal to excess parallel’s Lather’s (1993) notion of voluptuous validity or a validity of excess. 
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painters, from Degas to Picasso. However, both Velázquez and Tshibumba comment 
reflexively on the relation of artist to society, the business of representation, and the nature of 
sovereignty.  
 
 
 
 
      (reproduced with permission) 
At first sight Tshibumba offers a series of naive realist representations of major political events 
in the history of the Congo/Zaire, from the arrival of the Portuguese in the 15th century, through 
colonial rule, independence and the dictatorship of Mobutu. But a closer reading suggests a 
more transgressive self. Tshibumba lived in an ethnically fraught despotic regime, and so the 
themes of his painting pay tribute to rulers while subtly presenting national heroes like 
Lumumba as crucified oppositional figures who continue to stand for lost ideals of government, 
unity, civilisation, friendship and collective identity.  The themes of his paintings (this one and 
others) are simultaneously the record of a bloody past and a mnemonics of an ideal and 
therefore point forwards just as much as they point backwards. In creating this allegorical 
political space, his paintings indicate things which cannot safely be named8. Fabian refers to 
this as a ‘vociferous silence’ (1996: 306). We might also note that there is an interesting 
similarity between Tshibumba’s tactics of representation and those employed by Conrad in 
Heart of Darkness, another Congolese commentary that had to be careful of its readership (in 
this case Victorian, middle-class, and British) and yet which succeeded in offering a multi-
layered account ‘in order to question the reader’s positioning of themselves in relation to the 
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narrative’ (Hampson, in Conrad, 1910/1980: xxvi). Both conclude, or offer the possible 
conclusion, that ‘darkness is located at the heart of the “civilising” mission’ (ibid: xxxvi). 
According to Fabian, these paintings are also ‘[p]erformative acts that create or intensify co-
presence’ (1994: 253). We would rather express that co-presence in terms of an ‘I-We’ relation 
that underlies his paintings as communications. The collective 'We’ is black, colonised, 
oppressed and Congolese, and the paintings are ‘weapons of the weak’ (1994: 279), 
‘articulating popular memory’ (ibid: 276) by way of allegorical critique. 
 
Fabian’s account is entitled ‘Remembering the Present’ but we could just as easily see 
Tshibumba opening up a space where past and future can also be contemplated from the 
perspective of the collective ‘we’. That ‘we’ is national rather than ethnic, and clearly articulated 
to communal values such as peace, community and order. The subversive need to remember 
is suggestive of Kundera’s early writing, and is carried by much the same covert politics of 
resistance9. What seems immovable in Tshibumba’s work is the determined nature of the 
relation between artist and viewers, the ‘I–We’ relation. It emplots a story of collective loss, and 
of friendship betrayed. Features like these frame his series of paintings, and fix readings within 
certain limits.  
 
Other features of his picturing, however, open up more plural possibilities. First, there is the 
multi-layered nature of the paintings. They can be read as ‘realist’ paintings of ‘real’ historical 
events – and criticised on both grounds (eg faulty chronology, wrong birthplaces, illogical or 
impossible representations). But as Fabian argues: ‘His (Tshibumba’s) paintings are thoughts 
(…) that constitute his history, not illustrations of a pre-existing text’ (1996: 295). He is picturing 
a certain kind of political thinking, and knows it, as ‘an artist who paints history’ (1996: 261). 
The allegorical nature of the paintings allows Tshibumba to foreshorten chronology so that 
Portuguese and Belgian stand side by side, and Colonie Belge stands for the Mobutu regime 
and its covert indictment. This is strategic compression rather than error. Tshibumba paints in 
order to say something with ‘We the people’, and as Lee and LiPuma point out in another 
context, such a combination prioritizes the performative ‘We’ over the constative ‘the people’ 
                                                      
9 We have in mind Kundera’s ‘The Joke’ (1970) and ‘The Book of Laughter and Forgetting’ (1982). A further 
parallel is that Kundera’s stories are also the deliberate and sardonic emplotment of political thought within a 
totalitarian regime. 
 
10 A clandestine copying and distribution of literature especially in the formerly communist countries of the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe. 
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(2002: 193). The story is mainly told in terms of Blacks/Whites, although again it is implied that 
white oppression can be made to stand as a disguise for postcolonial oppressions as well. In 
such a telling, Tshibumba’s ‘I–Me’ relation is rather like that envisaged by Mead. The ‘me’ is 
fixed, historical, relatively unmoving and for Tshibumba much subordinate to the ‘we’, while the 
‘I’ is, as Mead indicates, ‘uncertain’, shifting, somewhat ambivalent, and in Tshibumba’s case 
tactically mobile (Mead 1934/1962: 176). Finally, these paintings belong within an oral culture 
of story-telling, and cannot therefore be read entirely as political acts on their own: a context of 
tradition is involved which informs local readings of the series. 
 
If we return to the picture with a ‘methodological’ frame in mind, we can see how a surface 
naive realism works as a cover for a more transgressive politics (cf Allan above). Allan’s text 
has its own ‘vociferous silences’. In another doctoral text a standpoint epistemology recurrently 
works a ‘civilisation – oppression’ polarity, inverting the many-sided claims of the former, and 
implying that oppression is a constant of the current context (cf doctorates of Rider and Lewis 
above). In a further instance, the doctoral ‘painter’ deploys indetermination in order to open up 
a political and defensible space for thinking, inviting a kind of solidarity from his audience 
through strategic indirection rather than representation (cf Jones in his ‘abuse’ of 
methodological genre). The aim is a transgressive validity (Lather 1993) rather than any direct 
representation, either in terms of chronology, or strict historical ‘fact’. The appeal is to an 
oppressed ‘we’ relation which can be inferred but may not be directly referred to. In the more 
reflexively radical of the theses such ‘oppression’ is also a marker of the ‘doctoral regime’. If not 
resistance to the spirit of Mobutu, this time, then perhaps Papa Doc? The act of resistance is 
an act of remembering, of condensing and visualizing the less public and more traditional 
genres of story-telling. It is a re-membering of the past as a political resource for a possible 
future. And as such it operates as a kind of public samizdat10.  
 
‘Picturing’, then, may be a performative metaphor for reflexivity. But in each case reflexivity 
may require a different ‘picturing’ of the agentic self in acts of (self)-creation. Velázquez’s Las 
Meñinas will also help us explore how different such picturing can be, and therefore how 
contingent and malleable reflexive practices can be, and have to be. We then try to work out 
what features of picturing may translate back across to research 
                                                      
11 The ‘I-me’ relation is literal to the painting, if we take the figure illuminated in the doorway - another Velasquez -
to be a further signature by the artist (Stoichita 1997). Velasquez thereby ‘triangulates’ himself in his 
representation and his commentary on representation. 
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methodology.
 
       (reproduced with permission) 
A first thought would be that Velázquez takes Mead’s advice at the beginning of this article – he 
sweeps himself into the picture in an act of apparently perfect reflexivity. There he is, looking 
out at us, brush in hand, the back of the canvas facing us, painting what we take to be the King 
and Queen who seem to stand where we also view the picture. This is where Velázquez 
himself must ‘really’ have stood in order to paint himself painting not the King and Queen 
(though they are in the mirror), but some of the rest of the royal family and court, in particular 
the Infanta and her entourage. The paradox is that ‘the viewer cannot be there where logically 
he must be’ (Bal, in Pollock, 1996: 30) - ‘he is painting the picture we see, but he can’t be 
because he is in the picture’ Megill (1985: 486). It is the instability of these perspectives that 
animates the picture by forcing  onlookers into reflective and reflexive action. They have to 
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work out what is going on. That working out reveals that Velázquez, like Tshibumba but in 
different ways, offers pictures that exceed the real. Indeed, we might claim that Tshibumba’s 
‘excess’ lies behind the picture in their coded and contextual nuances, whereas Velázquez’s 
‘excess’ lies in front of the picture. 
 
Like Tshibumba’s, this reflexive painting also addresses issues of sovereignty, but 
simultaneously pictures the role of the artist, and indeed the whole business of ‘classical’ 
representation. Unlike Tshibumba, it is dominated by an astonishing ‘I – me’ relation. It’s as if 
Velázquez was saying, ‘I, the Painter of Kings, am also the King of Painters’. But the self-
portrayal cannot be dismissed as narcissistic because it is the painterly nature of its production 
that is being emphasized. The ‘original’ ‘I-me’ relation passes (in both directions), through the 
brush of the painter and in turn the pen of the critics in its doubled journey from ‘scene’ to 
‘emplotment’, also with each movement the scene changes and is re-written. ‘I’, ‘thou’, ‘we’, 
‘them’, ‘us’ are all caught up in an instantaneous circulation of reflexive meaning (Stronach 
2002)11.  These figures enact and picture something like Kamuf’s earlier cited ‘I/we apart 
together’ (1997: 122) or perhaps a more sophisticated version of Peshkin’s ‘I’s. 
 
What is also framed in Las Meñinas is the act of framing. Velázquez empties Painter, the 
philosophy of Royalty, the technology of painting, the paradoxes of representation, as well as 
the impossibility of a settled perspective, across the canvas. Just as Tshibumba invoked an ‘I-
We’ relation in his spectators, so too does this painting insist on the participation of the 
spectator, an ‘I-Thou’ instability of relation that provokes later painters to rework its reflexive 
magic in their own, very different ways.  Velázquez draw us towards the spectacle that is 
observation itself. That is the fecundity of its reflexive ambition. 
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This time we can relate our reflexive theses to a double educative axis in the painting.12 The 
double sovereignty of painterly technique, and royal education, run orthogonal axes across the 
picture from left to right, and also from back (mirror) to front (the invisible ideal of a royal 
education for the Infanta located in the centre of the picture). In this doubling, Velázquez is a 
match for the king. So too in the reflexive theses: each in its own way works out an education 
of the researching self, while displaying (in some form or another) the tools of its trade whereby 
such selves are constructed, displayed, and left ‘open’ to interpretation and criticism.  
 
picturing figures 
 
‘One cannot see God from the back, because if he is not watching us, he is not God’ 
(Gell 1998: 192).  
 
There are a number of emergent themes in relation to reflexivity that we now wish to make 
more explicit and develop further. They comprise singularity, comprehensiveness, articulation, 
mobilisation and fecundity. Together they point to a version, a constellation, of reflexivity not as 
a prescription or model capable of typologisation and prioritisation in the ways Macbeth or 
Foley undertake, but more as a kind of Derridean or Deleuzian exemplarity whereby exactness 
and replication constitute ‘transcendental illusion’ (Deleuze 1994: 265). 
 
The first cluster imbricates singularity, comprehensiveness and articulation. Between the 
artists’ pictures there are significant differences – one is more solidary than the other. It 
addresses ‘We’ more than it addresses ‘Thou’. Each establishes a different ‘I-me’ relation, the 
one self-effacing, the other egocentric yet perhaps playfully so. Velázquez shows his face yet 
hides his work, while Tshibumba hides his face in showing his work allegorically – as our 
doctoral authors variously emplotted themselves in their own narratives. Yet both artists look at 
the world in order to picture it, paint the world in order to see it, and in doing so ‘draw in’ the 
observer as participant - a Thou - rather than  leaving them merely to gaze. Both suggest a 
form for reflexivity that denies the closure of a ‘model’.  These relations have parallels in the 
                                                      
12 Gill, after Polanyi, argues that the notion of the ‘axis’ is a useful one: ‘For the image of an axis suggests 
anchoring that is not fixed and in need of further support’ (Gill 2000: 57). This too, then, can be part of a certain 
constellation of metaphors with which we attempt to mobilise the notion of reflexivity and connect it to the nature of 
contemporary educational knowledge – in that ‘patchwork of metaphors’ that Sfard recommends (1998: 12). 
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literature on reflexivity.  Marcus imagines the contemporary Other as ‘counterparts’ – an 
interactive, agonistic version of the I-Thou relation (Marcus 2001: 453) dependent on 
‘renegotiations and reboundings’ (ibid. 523) – a kind of ‘drawing in’ of the Thou. Others 
formulate an I-Me relation in terms of ‘positionality (ies)’ or ‘assignment’ (Dixson et al 2005: 20; 
Macbeth 2001; Alexander 2003: 418, citing Butler), rather as Velasquez does in drawing 
himself, in punning with the figure in the doorway at the back of the picture13. In Macbeth’s 
terms, this is an act of ‘positional reflexivity’. Still others work at the I-We relation in terms of 
‘collective biography’ (Davies et al 2004: 360-389), just as Tshibumba does. We might agree 
with Marcus, therefore, that in order to read, we need to acknowledge a ‘theater of complicit 
reflexivities’, variously emplotted (Marcus 2001: 524).  
 
That ‘theater’ does not comprise a universal set for reflexivity. Indeed we might return here to 
Margalit’s distinction between ‘ie’ and ‘eg’ thinking by pointing out that each ‘reflexion’ 
combines depiction and exemplification in different proportions and ways. Embarking on this 
kind of ‘picturing’ venture, then, is always taking a singular leap into the unknown. The 
disjunction of the substantive and the methodological is different in each case – because it has 
to be crafted both by the individual who writes/paints, and the reader who interprets the 
necessary incompletions of the project. It involves the risk of the new, not merely the promise 
of the incremental. It follows that a methodology determined in advance – the absolute 
convention of our times – is self-defeating for any research that wishes to chance this kind of 
radical educational move.14 Reflexivity becomes through the processes of performing, 
exemplifying, deconstructing, and so on.  
                                                      
13 The figure in the doorway is also a ‘Velasquez’; his crooked elbow signs the ‘V’; his role as Chamberlain is the 
role to which the artist aspires. Or the figure can be read as unveiling the scene – ambivalence and indeterminacy 
are inevitable.  
14 The resurrected positivism of evidence-based practice and effectiveness/improvement studies exemplifies this 
current convention. David Hargreaves is a leading UK exponent. His most recent writing on ‘capital theory’ (2001: 
489) employs the ‘Johari window’ cliché in order to typify teacher ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’, idealising ‘high leverage’ 
as opposed to other states, such as ‘cynical tokenism’ and ‘short-term effectiveness by burn out’. This style of low-
level categorization was popular in the 70s. Indeed Haraway (1992: accessed 2/12/02) has effectively mocked the 
very same ‘infamous semiotic square’ as ‘this clackety, structuralist meaning-making machine’. See also 
Shavelson et al (2002) for US examples of ‘scientific’ educational research. 
 
15 We take the metaphor of mobilisation to indicate different and plural positionalities. It therefore relates to a kind 
of ‘base’ language based on identities which, sure enough, are redrawn as plural or shifting, or arrived at through 
‘tensive negotiation’ of selves, and so on (Alexander 2003: 430). The language of the ‘fluid’ is invoked (Knight et al 
2004: 392) yet as Macbeth argues each of these disclaimers still appeals to a more fixed territory of ideas: ‘The 
move [towards positional or textual reflexivity] promises new ground to stand on, shifting and unstable but, for that 
reason, possessing a field of view that could delineate the order and structure of first worlds and the conditions of 
their possibility’ (Macbeth 2001: 48). We take ‘lability’ to imply a turning away from such a register of implicit 
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The figure of reflexivity, we argue, is singular. Yet it articulates a number of subject 
perspectives, which may be more or less comprehensive, and sets them off against each other.  
It can be an achievement, but not a prescription or an application. There is no possible model. 
It is a working out that contains a productive contradiction in that, working from the actual, 
exceeds the ‘real’ just as Tshibumba and Velázquez do in their different ways. Reflexivity, then, 
is the working out, and in, of a kind of super-representation of actuality(ies).  We now turn to 
the nature of that working out, and to characterise it (gesturally) as a kind of mobilisation, or 
better, lability15, most aptly approached through the metaphor of the signature. This is the 
reflexive text as a travelling methodology, a kinetic epistemology, instead of the arrested 
convention (think Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Peshkin 1988) whose ‘classic’ features resist 
change precisely as a guarantor of their enduring worth.  
 
First, that productive contradiction we referred to earlier. When Velázquez looks us in the eye, 
he is of course playing a trick. He’s not ‘there’ in a number of obvious senses. The same might 
be said of ‘models’ of reflexivity, all of which presume to enable us to ‘look the other/self in the 
eye’. They play the same trick – Mead’s total reflexivity, or God’s back, both impossible as an 
accomplishment of the ‘I’ as Gasché indicates16. So those reflexivities which through alleged 
method look you in the eye, lie.  That is the false closure of the Model. ‘Picturing’ on the other 
hand, proceeds through the I, Thou and We (etc) as a kind of signature that can be deciphered 
- and made educative - by the reader. It is a ludic move, but it makes us look ourselves in the 
‘I’, impossibilities notwithstanding. It says: ‘You and I, we will never be here, and yet here we 
are’ (Stronach 2002: 294) 
                                                                                                                                                        
grounding, since it goes beyond arguments about ‘boundaries’ and ‘in-betweens’ in order to posit singular fluidities 
as ‘ anti-ground’ rather than extensions that fail to note that they conspire with their opposites. 
 
16 It might seem at first that such ‘total’ reflexivity falls prey to the dilemma that Gasché outlines: ‘Thus anyone 
who sets reflection into motion must already be both the knower and the known. The subject of reflection on its 
own thereby satisfies the whole equation ‘I=I’. Yet reflection alone was supposed to bring about this equation’ 
(1986: 99). We raise a number of arguments against such a dilemma: that the impossibility is productive, that 
Gasché neglects the ‘detour’ of the self through the other, as well as the impact of ‘I-We’ relations on self-
knowledge. 
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This unsettlement of the perspectival and the real involves both writer and reader, artist and 
interpreter, in oscillations that are a necessary condition of indeterminacy. Just as in reflexive 
novels such as Tristram Shandy, ‘... self-awareness arises out of a background of 
indeterminacy in the encounter with the other’ (Swearingen 1977: 82). The requirement for 
writer and reader is a kind of ideal movement: ‘His ideal [Sterne] requires that both he and his 
reader abandon themselves and their methods of procedure to the free play of the event in 
which new meanings unpredictably occur’ (Swearingen: 12). Let us call that a kind of signature 
relationship, invoked, necessary and yet incapable of prescription because subject to the multi-
faceted requirement of a situated yet ideal ‘play’. It is the necessary forgery of a reflexive 
thinking that would seek to include readers rather than just perform in front of them. 
 
After all, that is writing’s sleight-of-hand. It is also a kind of writing, a signature, that we always 
know to be a forgery as well as a deception – like Velázquez’s ‘presence’ in the picture. It 
brings together communal, personal and dialogic possibilities. Each is a possible vantage point, 
a perspectival difference. They contrast rather than collude, and they contradict productively. 
That bringing together is an increase, an exceeding of the real. In that sort of way, we approve 
of the allegorical projects of Tshibumba and of R. Jones’s thesis: they prohibit explication while 
nevertheless framing - illustrating - the sorts of creative responses they hope to engender. 
They avoid despoiling the reflexive project with a modernist intolerance of contradiction; they 
intend to exemplify. In the reflexive literature such plurality is often portrayed as static – 
between entities (segments of selves, assignments, others), subject of course to modification 
and alteration in a language of ‘fluidity’ and ‘shift’.  Useful as such local mobilisations are, they 
can trap us within root metaphors of relations between neighbours – ‘negotiation’, ‘boundary’, 
‘in-between-ness’ and so on. These boundaries are specific, dichotomous, and to an extent 
atomistic. We have in mind movements that are locally negotiated in those ways, but also are 
articulated more comprehensively or globally to each other by the ‘signature’. The signature is 
not so much a matter of boundary as a relation of one-for-all and all-for-one, on a plane of 
immanence distinct from dualistic boundary negotiation. Such a signature is not a holism, let 
alone a model-as-precipitate (in terms of a chemical analogy) but an event of lability subject to 
a mobilisation of singularities, comprehensiveness, and articulation.  What does that 
mobilisation mean? 
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conclusion 
The last section of this paper offers an account of the sorts of conceptual movement inherent in 
the notion of reflexivity we wish to explore. Gell’s reading of Marcel Duchamp is instructive 
here. Drawing on the early work of Husserl, he mobilises the work of art, setting it in motion 
with concepts of ‘retention’ and ‘protension’ (1998: 242).  All such works look forward and 
backward, and are part of a series. Each changes its meaning, is redefined, as time moves on. 
The work of art is inherently transitional, in a kind of motion that makes each appropriation of it 
unique, a work of the individual and of the moment17. But at the same time part of a style, still a 
signature, the still of a signed object. Yet nothing stays the same in the ‘durée’ of time. 
Redefinition is written into the oeuvre as a necessary aspect of its qualities. Gell relates that 
motion (which is indeterminate in the way we’re reaching towards) to ‘lineages’ (1998: 253), in 
relation to a certain kind of reflexivity. His account, based on Husserl’s ‘law of modification’ 
(ibid: 244), is however too linear. Whatever its rhetorical tolerance for radical change, it is 
founded diagrammatically and hence epistemologically on the line, the series A, B, C etc, with 
their prospective and retrospective allegiances as a guarantor of change. This is perspectival 
knowledge, serially envisaged. But disjunctive change, transformational change, is not 
envisaged epistemologically in such a model, which remains radically unradical. Nevertheless, 
Gell does refer in passing to a more labile notion of ‘perchings’ emanating from a folk belief: 
 
‘Everything as it moves, now and then, here and there, makes stops. The bird as it flies 
stops in one place to make its nest, and in another to rest in its flight. A man when he 
goes forth stops when he wills. So the god has stopped. The sun, which is so bright 
and beautiful, is one place where he has stopped. The moon, the stars, the winds, he 
has been with. The trees, the animals, are all where he has stopped, and the Indian 
thinks of these places and sends his prayers there to reach the place where the god 
has stopped and win help and a blessing’ (Durkheim, quoted in Levi-Strauss, 
Totemism, and cited in Gell 1998: 248-49). 
 
This is valuable. It introduces the concept of change as more idiosyncratically motivated, or in 
the words of Benjamin (1997: 457) ‘knowledge comes by way of thinking in images from 
                                                      
17 Picasso’s Guernica is a good example of this. Its positioning in relation to American art is as labile as its relation 
to US politics. It is shifted around as an icon of European art’s supremacy, just as it is rewritten as a ‘Communist’ 
statement from its prior status as an anti-Fascist discursive object. It is re-written in a series that then prefaces the 
transformations of Pollock and Rothko (van Hensbergen 2004). 
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“lightning flashes” – the text is the long roll of thunder that follows’.18 Yet, we need still more 
movement. Gell envisages a kind of historical mobility for concepts. But Deleuze and Guattari 
see a ‘signature’ as a different kind of mobilisation, as in their discussion of the Cartesian 
cogito ergo sum. Envisaging a concept as a plural thing, made up of zones, bridges and 
movement, they offer the following definition: ‘The concept is defined by the inseparability of a 
finite number of heterogeneous components traversed by a point of absolute survey at infinite 
speed’ (1994: 21, their stress). The Cartesian concept has movements like ‘doubting’, 
‘thinking’, and ‘being’ and it is the articulation of all of these (the ‘survey’ or ‘survol’ in their 
terms) that yields the concept. In a similar way, we envisage the ‘survol’ of ‘reflexivity’ as a 
sweeping through various mobilisations of ‘I’, ‘me’, ‘thou’, ‘we’ and ‘them’ in the singular 
articulation of a deliberative reflexion that is nevertheless a distributed object.  
 
Reflexivity, in that instance, is a chance rather than a model (Garratt 2003), whose serendipity  
is the paradoxical promise of its achievement. Marcus invokes the ‘rhetoric of serendipity’ as an 
expert preserve (2001: 527) but we wish to extend that preserve. We don’t apply reflexivity: we 
make it happen in the instance, a task for novice and ‘expert’ alike. The double movement, both 
serial and looping like the writing of a signature, constitutes not a methodological guarantee19 
(cf Peshkin and Heshusius) so much as a promise, as indeed a signature promises, even as it 
forges the ‘reality’ that is com-promised. It is contradictory, in that it is and it isn’t, it both 
exceeds and disappoints the reality that it addresses. That is the promise of the signature 
(Stronach, Piper and Piper, in Piper and Stronach 2004). The reflexive injunction, thus 
                                                      
18 The flash? When Sterne (1995) lets Tristram Shandy attempt to tell us the truth about a lady, in three words, 
which he does not write down. 
19 Calls for a looser ‘methodology’ in qualitative inquiries are now subject to the kinds of analogical scientism that 
often typifies epistemological rhetoric in quantitative educational inquiry. Such approaches in their reductive, 
simplistic, and normative approaches to educational events and meanings, automatically short-change the 
possibilities of new and creative educational options. They are a form of self-regulated discipline that would surely 
entertain Foucault. They ‘civilise’ educational research through methodological narrowing and pre-specification – 
that is the darkness at the heart of the UK government’s current mission. 
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constituted, remains a ‘thin’ text (in Margalit’s terms) engaged in the provocation of ‘thick’ texts 
of reflexive practice.20  
 
To conclude, we argue that such a notion of reflexivity opens up educational research to 
creative, non-arbitrary development: and takes us away from the current obsessions (which are 
more extra-professional than professional) with universalistic prescription and a priori 
methodological specification. They are a kind of educational death that educational research 
must resist. Current efforts to ‘nationalise’ educational research (as evidence-based practice, 
as nationalised research training and universally prescribed methodologies like RCTs) are all 
educationally backward in that they trail behind similar homogenizations in UK schooling, at 
least, that are already failing because of the ways in which they destroy creativity, originality, 
trust, and experimentation. To return for a last time to the generative metaphors of ‘art’ that 
inform this account, these approaches can be characterised as ‘painting by numbers’. Such 
movements are recurrent in the West, and a century ago Frazer noted the ideological closure: 
‘the element of chance and of accident are banished from the course of nature’ (in Tambiah 
1990: 68). Almost as long ago, Robert Musil, in The Man without Qualities, began to mock such 
modernist and scientistic ambitions as ‘the utopia of exact living’ (Musil 1997: 395). Not only is 
it wrong to elevate Science as pharmakon in this way, it is doubly wrong to characterise 
‘Science’ in such reductive ways, because if Tambiah is right in his definition of Science, it is 
what we propose – ‘a self-conscious, reflexive, open-ended process of knowledge construction’ 
(ibid.). 
 
‘A concept is a brick. It can be used to build the courthouse of reason. Or it can be 
thrown through the window’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: xii). 
 
 
                                                      
20 ‘Thick descriptions are culturally bound and historically sensitive, whereas thin descriptions are more context-
independent’ (Margalit 2002: 38). 
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